In an experiment, African villagers could form groups to share risk in a gamble choice game. The extent to which grouping arrangements were or could be enforced and, hence, the importance of trust and social enforcement as supports for group formation were exogenously varied. Participants in the experiment are much more likely to form a group with individuals of the same sex. There was less gender assorting when grouping depended on trust, in part, due to trust based on co-memberships in gender-mixed religions. Perfect enforcement and social enforcement led to statistically indistinguishable levels of assorting, in part, because valuable on-going series of interactions associated with co-memberships in CBOs are almost as commonplace between as within the sexes.
1 Introduction these circumstances, group formation and maintenance relies on trust and social or informal enforcement. But how do these factors a¤ect or relate to gender assorting? Is trust stronger within as compared to between the sexes? If it is, we would see more assorting when trust is important. And is social enforcement easier within single-sex as compared to mixed-sex groups?
If it is, we would see more assorting when social enforcement is important.
We contribute to the literature on assortative matching by addressing these questions using an experiment conducted in 14 Zimbabwean villages. Within the experiment, the villagers played a game in which group formation was bene…cial as it allowed group members to share risk. This in turn enabled them to take on more risk and thereby secure higher expected experimental payo¤s. To investigate the e¤ects of trust and social as opposed to formal enforcement on assorting by gender three treatments were applied, with each village being randomly assigned to one of these treatments.
In the …rst treatment (Treatment 1), the risk sharing group formation agreements were perfectly enforced by the experimenter. In the analysis, this treatment serves as the control.
Under this treatment there was some, but not perfect, assorting into groups by gender. In the second treatment (Treatment 2), the group formation agreements were supported only by trust. Participants could secretly leave their groups if it was in their own self interest to do so.
However, such defectors were likely to be leaving their co-groupers with greater exposure to risk and, this being the case, less group formation was expected under Treatment 2 as compared to Treatment 1. At the same time, if trust is stronger within as compared to between the sexes , we would expect to observe more assorting by gender under Treatment 2 as compared to Treatment 1. On the other hand, if trust is embodied within some form of social tie that tends not to be gender assortative then we would expect to observe less assorting by gender under Treatment 2 as compared to Treatment 1. Marsden (1987) found less assorting on gender in contexts where ties of kinship were important, although he did not account for trust in his analysis. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) found a strong association between a¢ liation to the same religious community and trust, although they did not account for gender in their analysis. Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps (2009) found that, in this experiment, kinship supported group formation, though not especially when trust was important, while belonging to the same religious congregation supported group formation under Treatment 2, when trust was important, but was of no consequence under Treatment 1. However, they did not link these …ndings to gender.
In the third treatment (Treatment 3), if participants wished to leave their groups, they had to do so in public. Thus, under Treatment 3, the formation of groups within the experiment was e¤ectively inserted into the ongoing series of village-based interactions. Under these circumstances defection could have been deterred through social enforcement and this could have made grouping more attractive under Treatment 3 than Treatment 2. However, if social enforcement is costly not only to a defector but also to an enforcer, possibly because it disrupts and jeopardizes valuable but vulnerable ongoing series of interactions, group formation may have been less attractive under Treatment 3. Barr and Genicot (2008) demonstrated this theoretically and found, using this experiment, that there was indeed less group formation under Treatment 3.
Later, Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2009) showed that pairs of individuals who were engaged in more valuable but vulnerable ongoing series of interactions (proxied by the number of voluntary, community-based-organizations (CBOs) serving an economic purpose that they both belonged to) were less likely to group together under Treatment 3. So, if valuable but vulnerable ongoing series of interactions are more likely to exist within as compared to between the sexes, we would expect less assorting by gender under Treatment 3 than under either Treatment 1 or 2.
We analyze the data from the experiment in conjunction with data from surveys and genealogical mapping exercises. Applying a dyadic approach, we …nd that there is less assorting 5 into groups on the basis of gender in Treatment 2 (trust) as compared to Treatment 1 (control) and neither more nor less assorting into groups on the basis of gender in Treatment 3 (social enforcement) as compared to Treatment 1 (control). Further exploration of the data shows that the reduction in assorting between Treatments 1 and 2 is, in part but far from entirely, due to the trust associated with shared religion. Perfect enforcement and social enforcement led to statistically indistinguishable levels of assorting, in part, because interactions associated with co-memberships in CBOs are almost as commonplace between as within the sexes.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present our conceptual framework and testing strategy. The data are discussed in Section 3. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. And, in Section 5, we conclude.
Experimental design
The experiment involves a simple gamble choice game. One series of two rounds of this game was played in each of 14 villages. The rounds took between one and two hours each and were held on consecutive days. The day before the experiment started in each of the selected villages, each household was visited and invited to send an adult of a speci…c gender to be a subject in the experimental series in their village. Whether a man or a woman was requested was randomly determined, although if none of the speci…ed gender was present, a member of the other was acceptable. They were told that, preferably, their representative would be either the household head or their spouse as these are the principle decision makers in the households.
In the …rst round, played the day after the recruitment, each participant was interviewed privately and asked to select one of six possible gambles g, ranked from the least (1) to the most risky (6). The gamble choice set was the same for all participants with equally likely high and low earnings. Riskier gambles had higher expected returns. After selection of the gamble 6 choice the game was played and realized gains were paid to the participants in private. This game structure was originally used by Binswanger (1980) to elicit risk preferences: the choice of gamble implies a range of possible values for the individual's coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
The gambles used in our experiment are presented in Table 1 together with the implied ranges of the risk aversion coe¢ cient. 2 Once the …rst round of gamble choices was complete the participants were invited to return and play the gamble choice game again the next day. Participants were then given the opportunity to form 'sharing groups'with other participants from the same village. They were told that, within 'sharing groups', second round winnings would be pooled and shared equally. 3 Each village was randomly assigned to one of three di¤erent institutional environments. In Treatment 1, equal sharing of winnings among group members was exogenously enforced by the experimenter: having joined a sharing group, the members could not subsequently change their mind. So, regardless of gamble outcomes, winnings were pooled and shared equally.
In Treatment 2, each member of a sharing group could separately and secretly leave their groups after …nding out the outcome of their gamble. In this case, they kept their winnings but received no share of the winnings of others in the group. In this treatment, the bene…ts associated with joining a group depended on the level of trust.
Treatment 3 di¤ered from Treatment 2 in that individuals who chose to leave their groups had to publicly con…rm that they were doing so in front of all the other participants in their village. In this treatment, the bene…ts associated with group formation depended on the ease with which social enforcement could be applied and the potential damage that its application might do to ongoing valuable but vulnerable series of interactions .
Under each treatment, the consequences of and rules relating to risk sharing group formation and defection were explained to the participants at the end of the session on the …rst day. The participants were then given approximately 24 hours to form a group. If they chose to do so they had to register together on the second day of the game. The second round gamble choices were made during private interviews and no rules were applied to or recommendations made concerning gamble choices within groups. Under Treatment 2, decisions to leave groups and, under Treatment 3, intentions to leave groups were also expressed and recorded during these interviews. Under Treatment 3, decisions to leave groups had to be con…rmed by the leavers revealing themselves to all present when invited to do so after all participants had made their decisions in private interviews. Finally, under all treatments, each participant received their winnings during a second, brief, private interview just prior to being dismissed.
Empirical formulation
Building on the work of Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2009) by construction. As noted by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) , this implies that the explanatory variables must enter the model symmetrically. So, the …rst model that we estimate is: We then expand the model to include two additional sets of interaction terms:
A signi…cant positive (negative) coe¢ cient 1 indicates that assortative matching by gender is lower (higher) in the corresponding treatment, while coe¢ cient 2 picks up the di¤erential e¤ects of the treatments on grouping by women and men.
Models (1) and (2) are estimated using a Logit. When estimating these models it is essential to correct standard errors for non-independence across observations. Non-independence arises in part because residuals from dyadic observations involving the same individual i are correlated, negatively or positively, with each other. Standard errors can be corrected for this type of non-independence by clustering either by dyad, as proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), or by village (and, hence, by experimental session). The second approach corrects for possible non-independence not only within dyadic pairs sharing a common i or j but also across all the dyads participating in the same experimental session. Because we have data from 14 village sessions we are able to apply the second, more rigorous approach. 5
The data
The experiment was conducted in 23 Zimbabwean villages in 2001. However, in this paper we use the data from only 14 of these villages. Of the remaining 9, 3 made up a control sample in which no group formation was allowed and 6 were not fully enumerated during the various surveys and mapping exercises upon which we draw. Of the 14 villages in our sample, 10 were established in the early 1980s as result of land redistribution. These resettled villages are relatively small and geographically concentrated. They have a strong agricultural focus and a stable composition.
Most heads of households and their spouses have resided in the village for at least one decade.
Due to the random selection of settlers, the adult inhabitants of these villages are less likely to be genetically related to each other compared to members of the non-resettled villages. However, they engage more in associational activity and have more marriage ties within the villages (see Barr (2004) and Dekker (2004) (2000) and Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001) discuss this dataset in detail.
In the analysis we make use of information relating to three types of pre-existing ties. Data on kinship ties are drawn from speci…cally designed social mapping exercises. These were conducted purpose -e.g., micro-…nance, mutual insurance, funeral societies, irrigation and livestock rearing cooperatives. Sports clubs, choirs, and dance groups are excluded from the analysis because they were found by Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps (2008) not to a¤ect group formation within the experiment, and also because they are highly sex-segregated. 6 Also reported in Table 2 is the proportion of the sample playing under each of the treatments, the proportion who joined groups, the average gamble choices (where the gamble choice identi…er is treated as being cardinal for brevity), and the average winnings per subject in each round of the experiment. 8 Treatment 2 is under-represented in the sample. This is the result of having to drop a number of villages due to incomplete data. However, there remain su¢ cient observations under each treatment to make meaningful comparisons. Gamble choices in round 1 are included in the logit regressions to control for attitudes towards risk. Winnings in round 1 are included to control for income e¤ects -and for the possibility that individuals take high winnings in the …rst round as indication that their luck is in and that, as a consequence, they have no need for insurance in the form of risk sharing. Grouping decisions are the focus of our analysis: just under half of the participants joined sharing groups in the second round of the experiment and the average group size is just over 3 members.
Summary statistics
Turning to the characteristics of the relationships between participants, we use the kinship data to construct a variable indicating whether a dyad is related either by blood or marriage. 9
When interpreting results relating to this variable, it is important to recall that each household was invited to send only one representative to the experimental session in their village. So, husbands and wives are never present together, and people are in the same experiment as their children or siblings only if they live in separate households. Furthermore, most villages in the study were made up of stranger households at the time of their resettlement in the early 1980s.
As a consequence the majority of the kinship ties in the dataset are between in-laws. Religious co-membership is captured by a dummy variable indicating that members i and j of a dyad belong to the same religious congregation and a count variable is used to capture the number of CBOs (serving an economic purpose) in which both i and j are members. Table 3 summarizes the dyadic sample containing each possible pair of participants within each of the 14 villages. Because the average group size is small, only 7 percent of all withinvillage dyads are in the same group. Given that the sample is nearly equally divided between male and female participants, just under half of all dyads are made up of one female and one male. The average dyad contains just over one female.
Although almost nine out of every ten participants belong to a religious congregation, only 19 percent of the dyads belong to the same church. This re ‡ects the diversity of faiths present in each of the studied villages. The average dyad share membership in just under one CBO. 6 Empirical results
Group formation and gender
We begin our analysis with a simple cross-tabulation of the data. As well as revealing the overall level of gender assorting in the data, cross-tabulation alerts us to small cell sizes which can lead to spurious …ndings in multivariate analysis.
The cross tabulations are reported in Table 4 in the form of a 4 4 matrix. The top left-hand cell relates to the full dyadic sample described in Table 3 . All the other cells relate to sub-samples variably de…ned. In the top row of the matrix, the full sample, pooled across treatments, is divided into sub-samples with respect to dyad type: in the second column all female dyads are considered; in the third all male dyads are considered; and in the fourth mixed gender dyads are considered. The number of dyadic observations in each cell is listed at the top of the cell. Mixed gender dyads represent roughly half in each treatment.
The top right-hand cell shows that, across all treatments only 2.1 percent of mixed gender dyads co-group whereas 14 percent of female dyads and 10 percent of male dyads co-group.
The di¤erences in co-grouping between mixed gender dyads and both types of same-gender dyad are statistically signi…cant and indicate assortative matching by gender: participants in the experiment are much more likely to form a group with individuals of the same sex. This is also illustrated by the gender composition of the groups. Of the 47 groups formed during the experiment, 17 groups (36only, 21 (45co-grouping between female dyads and male dyads, however, is not statistically signi…cant suggesting that the assorting is not due to common preferences.
The second, third, and fourth rows of the table split the sample by treatment. In the …rst column of Table 4 we see that, while between 11 and 12 percent of dyads co-grouped 14 under Treatment 1 (control: externally enforced contracts), only 9 percent co-grouped under Treatment 2 (trust), and just two percent co-grouped under Treatment 3 (social enforcement).
The fourth column of Table 4 is the most interesting for our purpose. While only two percent of mixed-gender dyads co-group under Treatment 1, over …ve percent co-group under Treatment 2. The opposite pattern is observed for male and female dyads: in both cases, the proportion of dyads that co-group is smaller in Treatment 2 than Treatment 1. In Treatment 3 not even one percent of mixed gender dyads co-group. 10 These di¤erences in treatment e¤ects on same-and mixed-gender dyads are presented graphically in Figure 1 . The full heights of the columns in the histogram indicate the proportion of dyads co-grouping under each treatment. Each column is divided into same-gender (teal green) and mixed-gender (orange) segments. The Figure shows clearly the overall decline in co-grouping and the simultaneous increase in mixed-gender grouping as we move from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2.
Table 4 also shows that female dyads are more likely than male dyads to share a family tie and/or a religious co-membership. They are also more likely than male dyads to belong to the same CBO. In contrast, mixed gender dyads resemble the full sample in terms of family ties and religious and CBO co-memberships. The di¤erences between all female and all male dyads justify moving to multivariate analysis.
Coe¢ cient estimates for models (1) and (2) are presented columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 respectively. Controls include family ties, religious co-membership, co-memberships in CBOs, and interaction terms between these network variables and Treatments 2 and 3. We see in model
(1) (…rst column of the table) that, even with the controls, the mixed gender dyad dummy has a highly signi…cant negative coe¢ cient. This con…rms the result reported in Table 4 . The marginal e¤ect that can be derived from the estimated coe¢ cient indicates that mixed gender 1 0 Care should be taken when considering further sub-divisions of this cell.
dyads are …ve percentage points less likely to co-group than same-gender dyads.
The second column of Table 5 reports results from model (2) which contains interaction terms between the 'mixed gender dyad' dummy and indicator variables for Treatments 2 and 3. 11 We see that the coe¢ cient on 'T2 x mixed gender dyad'is positive and signi…cant, while the coe¢ cient on 'T3 x mixed gender dyad'is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. These …ndings are broadly consistent with those reported in Table 4 and Figure 1 . The coe¢ cient on the 'mixed gender dyad' dummy is much larger in model (2) than in model (1); according to model (2), under Treatment 1 mixed gender dyads are eight percentage points less likely to co-group than same-sex dyads, whereas under Treatment 2 they are less than one half of a percentage point less likely to co-group. This seems to suggest that, under Treatment 2, there is no gender assorting.
However, a linear restriction test indicates that gender assorting, while minimal, is statistically signi…cant under Treatment 2. 
Gender assorting and trust
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that gender assorting is less pronounced when trust is important. In the introduction, we conjectured that this would occur if trust, instead of being stronger within as compared to between the sexes, was embodied in a form of social tie that 1 1 Treatment 1 is the basis for comparison.
16
tends not to be gender assorted.
In Table 5 , we see that, consistent with Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) and Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2009) , co-religion is more important in Treatment 2, indicating that it is associated with trust. If, in addition, there is little or no gender assorting into religions, the co-grouping with members of the same religion under Treatment 2 could cause individuals to select into more gender-diverse groups. Table 4 shows that mixed gender dyads are only slightly less likely than same-sex dyads to be members of the same religious congregation (18 percent as compared to 21 percent). 12
However, to establish whether and how much of the reduction in gender assorting between Treatments 1 and 2 is due to the increased importance of co-religion, we need to augment model (2) by including an additional interaction term 'T2 x mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membership'. 13 If the coe¢ cient on this term is positive and signi…cant, it can be taken as evidence that the increased importance of religious co-membership under Treatment 2 accounts for at least some of the reduction in gender assorting between Treatments 1 and 2. If, in addition, the coe¢ cient on 'T2 x mixed gender dyad' becomes statistically insigni…cant once the interaction term is included, we can conclude that the increased importance of religion in Treatment 2 fully explains the decrease in gender assorting.
The results of this exercise are shown in the second column of Table 6 . (The …rst column in Table 6 is identical to column 2 in Table 5 and is included to provide a basis for comparison.)
The coe¢ cient on 'T2 x mixed gender dyad x religious co-membership' is positive and highly signi…cant. In addition, a linear restriction test indicates that there is no gender assorting in group formation among dyads sharing a religious co-membership. Finally, the coe¢ cient on 'T2
x mixed gender dyad'is still signi…cant but smaller in magnitude.
To test the robustness of these …ndings, in the third column of Table 6 we include additional interaction terms. The …rst is an interaction between the family tie dummy and 'T2 x mixed gender dyad'. The second is an interaction between co-membership in CBO's and 'T2 x mixed gender dyad'. The inclusion of these terms also allow us to explore the possibility that other types of social tie are performing a similar role to co-religion under Treatment 2. 14 Neither of these two new interaction terms with the mixed gender dyad dummy bears signi…cant coe¢ cients and the estimated coe¢ cients on 'T2 x mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membership'and 'T2
x mixed gender dyad'change very little.
Note the signi…cant negative coe¢ cient on 'T2 x Number of females x Family.' This suggests that within family networks women engage in less grouping activity than men under Treatment 2. This is interesting as it suggests that, compared to men, women are either less trusting of or less trustworthy towards their kin, principally their in-laws. 15
Gender and CBO membership
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that gender assorting is neither more nor less pronounced when grouping relies on social enforcement rather than being perfectly enforced. Referring back to the conjectures we set out in the introduction above, this …nding is consistent with valuable but vulnerable ongoing series of interactions being just as likely to exist between as compared to within the sexes.
It would be useful to corroborate this. We do not have direct measures of the value and vulnerability of each dyads' ongoing series of interactions. However, we do have a proxy that appears to be capturing these e¤ects: dyads sharing more co-memberships in CBOs are less likely to group under Treatment 3, suggesting that such co-memberships are valuable and vulnerable.
And, turning to Table 4 , we see that there is some gender assorting in economic CBOs. On average, mixed sex dyads share 0.77 CBO co-memberships, while same sex dyads share 1.10 CBO memberships. However, while this di¤erence is statistically signi…cant (according to a ttest) it is small in magnitude and there are many mixed gender dyads that share co-membership in one or more economic CBOs.
Summary and conclusion
Assortative matching has been observed in many social contexts. Using an experiment we examine assorting on gender when economically useful groups are formed in developing-country villages. Assorting on gender, while only occasionally observed in developed-country studies, has been casually observed by many in developing countries and is now systematically being built into many group-oriented development interventions. And yet, very little is known about the mechanisms underlying the emergent gender assorting in developing countries, while, based on studies elsewhere, concerns are being raised about, …rst, the cumulative e¤ect of assorting and, second, the constraints that assorting places on information ‡ows, attitudes, and aspirations.
The formation and maintenance of economically useful groups in developing countries relies on trust and social enforcement. So, our experiments were designed to explore the interplay between trust and social enforcement on the one hand and gender assorting on the other. Analyzing the data resulting from this experiment in combination with data on pre-existing social ties and individual characteristics, we …nd: less gender assorting when group formation depends on trust compared to when no trust is required; that, to an extent, this is because religious co-memberships embody trust and are only mildly gender assortative; and that the valuable but vulnerable ongoing series of interactions that participants in the experiment may seek to protect from the potentially damaging e¤ects of social enforcement are almost as commonplace between the sexes as within the sexes.
These …ndings are heartening. They indicate that, in the villages where the experiments were conducted at least, men are as likely to trust women as they are to trust men and vice-versa Notes: 'Female-male dyads', 'Join same group', Same religious group', and 'Family' are all dichotomous (0,1) variables, so their means and percentages of non-zeros are equivalent; 'Comemberships. in CBOs' is a count variable, so the means and percentages of non-zeros are not identical. 0.226 0.233 (*) absolute differences in and sums of age, household headship dummies, years of schooling, log household income, log livestock wealth, 1st round gamble choices, and 1st round winnings; Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for non-independence within villages/sessions by clustering; n=10470 throughout; *** -significant at 1%; ** -significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for nonindependence within villages/sessions by clustering; n=10470 throughout; *** -significant at 1%; ** -significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
(*) absolute differences in and sums of age, household headship dummies, years of schooling, log household income, log livestock wealth, 1st round gamble choices, and 1st round winnings;
Appendix 234 (*) absolute differences in and sums of age, household headship dummies, years of schooling, log household income, log livestock wealth, 1st round gamble choices, and 1st round winnings; Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for non-independence within villages/sessions by clustering; n=10470 throughout; *** -significant at 1%; ** -significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
